What Does “Head” (Kephalē) Mean in Paul’s Letters? Part 6: Ephesians 1:22 and 4:15

6 comments on “What Does “Head” (Kephalē) Mean in Paul’s Letters? Part 6: Ephesians 1:22 and 4:15”

1. 

   James Giordano on February 15th, 2024 - 5:04pm

   I very much appreciate and value the work of theologians and scholars. I also acknowledge that some biblical passages are challenging to understand. But I don’t think God’s Word is as difficult for lay people to understand as some scholars make it out to be. The Holy Spirit knew how His Words would be understood by most believers. While there are certainly errors in interpretation and application made by both complementarians and egalitarians, I think the plain meaning of the vast majority of Scriptures that touch on the roles, responsibilities, and relationships between men and women strongly favors the complementarian interpretations.

   Reply
2. 

   Greg Coles on February 15th, 2024 - 10:29pm

   On the subject of polysemy: While I agree that your comments in the first blog post merited some revision, I’d argue that this new framing imports a different error. On the one hand, you’re quite right to offer the correction that “polysemy doesn’t mean ‘two meanings at the same time'”; that is, simultaneity of meaning isn’t inherent in the definition of polysemy. But I think your new framing exaggerates the rarity (or interpretive irrelevance) of potential simultaneity, especially insofar as broadly similar denotative meanings can be layered with multiple and even contradictory connotative meanings. Rhetorical theorists tend to argue that different groups of people have the capacity to receive the same messages very differently (hence the need to communicate adaptively to differing audiences)—and part of this variability in reception can be due the ways people prioritize their awareness of words’ multiple functions.

   An obvious example here would be something like the word “queer” in the 21st century, which has (among other meanings) both a strongly pejorative sense and an honorific (or at least neutral) one. Most people who encounter the word in the wild are predisposed to prioritize one of these senses over the other; but many of them encounter it with an awareness that both senses exist, and therefore both senses have some complex simultaneous relationship to the word’s invocation.

   A bit closer to this current series: Consider the (vexingly ambiguous) power of the phrase “women’s church leadership.” Broadly speaking, we’re all working with the same basic denotative understanding of leadership (though if tasked with deciding whether we mean “the office or position of a leader” or “the act or an instance of leading”—two different definitions in Merriam-Webster—some of us might shrug and say, “Maybe both?”). But part of the rhetorical power of the phrase is that it can call to mind more than one kind of leadership at once, and which kind of leadership is perceived says as much (or perhaps more) about the listener/reader as it does about the communicator. Are we talking about endorsement/restriction of a very narrow set of leadership activities, or endorsement/restriction of leadership more broadly conceived? The word could do both kinds of work—and indeed, has done both kinds of work—depending on who says it to whom, and when, and why.

   To be clear, this isn’t precisely an objection to anything I’ve seen Kevin Grasso arguing. But there are some important disciplinary differences in focus between linguistics (which is Grasso’s field) and rhetorical theory (which is mine), including the attention each discipline habitually gives to the theoretical codification of language versus the rhetorical function of language. When Kevin writes that, “Polysemous words must be disambiguated, which means that we must ascribe a particular sense to each use of the word,” his word “must” is true insofar as the aim of the disambiguation is a coherent codification of language. But in rhetorical analysis, disambiguation is of less importance than rhetorical effect; and when we examine effects, the capacity of words to do more than one thing properly belongs as part of the analysis rather than a question to be answered prior to analysis.

   When you write, “While two meanings at the same time are possible, this is quite rare outside of poetry,” I agree in one sense; I’d simply propose that language as a whole functions far more poetically than we may give it credit for. (This is one of Kenneth Burke’s major suggestions in his essay “Semantic and Poetic Meaning,” for instance.) In fact, lots of early semioticians—including Charles Sanders Peirce, sometimes described as the father of modern semiotics—spent a decent amount of time trying to rescue language from the interpretive messiness created by polysemy, which they saw as an endemic flaw in communication. (See, for instance, Peirce’s “The Ethics of Terminology”; Joel Weinsheimer describes this essay as portraying a conflict between Peirce’s “desire for semantic fixity” and his “recognition that the symbol is amorphous and alive.”)

   In the end, I don’t find the denotative debate over κεφαλή particularly important to complementarian/egalitarian questions, so I don’t think solving the degree of potential simultaneous meaning in its interpretation is a great necessity. But as to whether Paul might have ever used polysemous words (in contexts where both he and his original hearers would be aware of the polysemy) in a way that never definitively solves the question of disambiguation and therefore refuses to foreclose certain interpretive possibilities, I wouldn’t want us to reject this possibility out of hand on purely theoretical grounds.

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   • 

     preston on February 23rd, 2024 - 8:50pm

     Greg, thanks so much for your very thorough and incisive comment! I’m actually going to be teasing out some of what I think you’ll consider the rhetorical impact of words and metaphors in my next post. In fact, I do have a short aside in that post that explores, once again, how I’m thinking through metaphor. Here’s what I say; I’d love your thoughts (of course, you’ll need the larger context to fully get my point, but I’m curious what you think about my “he’s such a pig” analogy.

     ———————————–

     The specific kind of authority Paul intends to convey by the head-metaphor is narrowly defined as self-giving love.

     This point isn’t me being creative or slippery. It’s just how metaphors work. Metaphors typically convey a specific meaning based on context. For instance, the phrase “he’s such a pig” can mean various things depending on how it’s used. If I were looking at a guy shoving a bunch of food down his mouth, “he’s such a pig” means something like he’s eating very sloppily or it could also mean he’s eating way too much (or possibly both). I probably don’t mean he’s eating on all fours or is feeding on rotten vegetables from a trough, or everything else that might come with pigness. In another context, the sense of “eating too much” might not be present. If I were watching a 1 year old with mushy peas all over his face, high chair, bib, and hands, and then I said “he’s such a pig,” here I probably only mean “he’s a messy eater;” I’m not necessarily saying anything about the quantity of peas going down the kid’s gullet. Not everything about pigness transfers over in the use of the metaphor.

     We might encounter another meaning altogether for “he’s such a pig.” In another context, “he’s such a pig” could refer to how a guy is treating women. “That guy is such a pig! He dates a different girl every week, and everyone he’s with, he treats them like crap.” Here, the pig metaphor has nothing to do with eating. But we know this from the context. The phrase alone—“he’s such a pig”—cannot tell us what exactly it is about pigness that’s being communicated.

     I think something similar is going on in Ephesians 5. The metaphor of “head” by itself conveys some sense of authority, but we need the context to tell us what exactly Paul means by authority, which of course he does. He defines “head” with “Savior,” and then spells out in detail what Christ as Savior looks like—self-sacrificial love and service. Paul does not mean that the husband has categorical authority over his wife in every sense and in every way that Christ has authority over the church, nor does he mean that a husband, as “Savior,” atones for the sins of his wife through his sacrificial death. Paul tells us exactly what he means by “head/Savior.” He means self-giving love and service toward his wife (5:25-29).

     Reply
3. 

   Philip B. Payne on March 5th, 2024 - 11:44pm

   Preston writes, “I really don’t think it matters nearly as much as Phil thinks it does [to distinguish between simile, metaphor, and literal uses of kephalē]. Phil seems to think that if kephalē is used in a simile to convey “authority,” this is irrelevant for understanding what kephalē means as a metaphor.”

   Philip B. Payne: I have never said that the use of kephalē in similes to convey “authority” is irrelevant for understanding what kephalē means as a metaphor. What I have said is that no use of kephalē in a simile can establish a new metaphorical meaning for kephalē. The use of kephalē in a simile may be relevant to understanding what a particular author thought regarding whether the head or the heart is the seat of authority in the physical body. This may contribute to our understanding of the use of kephalē in some metaphors. But use of kephalē in similes referring to a physical head is never by itself sufficient evidence to establish a new metaphorical meaning of kephalē. Only actual metaphors can establish new metaphorical meanings.

   Preston must learn to recognize how important it is to distinguish between simile, metaphor, and literal uses of kephalē for the purpose of determining what meanings of kephalē were established at the time Paul wrote. Preston has repeatedly cited Grudem.

   Grudem has grossly distorted the evidence of secular Greek dictionaries. Grudem writes, “All the recognized lexicons (dictionaries) for ancient Greek, or their editors, now give kephalē the meaning ‘person in authority over’ or something similar, but none give the meaning ‘source’” (Evangelical Feminism and Biblical Truth, p. 206). I have documented in earlier posts that both assertions are not only false but are nearly the opposite of the truth. In fact, most dictionaries of ancient secular Greek don’t cite any example of this word meaning “authority,” including Moulton and Milligan, Friedrich Preisigke, Pierre Chantraine, S. C. Woodhouse, LSJ and its supplements by E. A. Barber, R. Renehan, and P. G. W. Glare and the thirteen additional lexicons cited by Richard S. Cervin, “Does Kephalē mean ‘Source’ or ‘Authority Over’ in Greek Literature? A Rebuttal,” Trinity Journal 10 NS (1989) 85–112, at 86–87. The earliest citation of any meaning related to “authority” that I have found in any secular Greek dictionary is from the 4th century AD. Liddell and Scott’s seventh and eighth editions identify the meaning “chief” as “Byzantine.” Dhimitrakou’s 9-volume dictionary lists the meaning “leader” as “medieval.” Both Byzantine and medieval are historical periods long after Paul wrote.

   The meaning “source,” however, is common in dictionaries of ancient secular Greek. The ninth-century lexicographer Photius explained κεφαλή in 1 Corinthians 11:3 as “begetter” (γεννήτωρ) and “originator” (προβολεύς) [Staab, Pauluskommentare 567.1–2 regarding 1 Cor 11:3; cf. Christos Theodoridis, ed., Photii Patriarchae Lexicon, vol. 2 [Epsilon – Mu] (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1998)]. The twelfth-century Johannes Zonaras Lexicon, the sixteenth-century lexicons by Petrina, Estienne, and Budé, Tusanus, Gesner and Junius, and later lexicons by Passow, Pape, Schenkl, Woodhouse, Bailly, Bölting, Rost, Feyerabend, Montanari, and Banks also list the meaning “source” for κεφαλή. NIDNTT states that in 1 Cor 11:3 “head is probably to be understood not as ‘chief’ or ‘ruler’ but as ‘source’ or ‘origin’.”

   In spite of Grudem’s gross distortions of the evidence from secular dictionaries of ancient Greek, he has correctly acknowledged that it is crucial to distinguish between established metaphorical meaning and uses of kephalē in similes. For instance, in Evangelical Feminism and Biblical Truth, p,. 769 he quotes John Chadwich’s Lexicograhica Graeca, pp. 23–24:
   “A constant problem to guard against is the proliferation of meanings … It is often tempting to create a new sense to accommodate a difficult example, but we must always ask first, if there is any other way of taking the word which would allow us to assign the example to an already established sense … As I have remarked in several of my notes, there may be no reason why a proposed sense should not exist, but is there any reason why it must exist?”

   Preston cites as his example of why “I really don’t think it matters nearly as much as Phil thinks it does [to distinguish between simile, metaphor, and literal uses of kephalē]” Josephus, War, 3.54:
   “the royal city Jerusalem was the supreme, and rules (archei) over all the neighboring country, as the head (kephalē) does over the body.”
   Preston continues: Phil writes: “In this case, ‘head’ is literal and is used in a simile. This is not a metaphor or non-literal use of ‘head’.” Phil is right. I shouldn’t have labeled this a “non-literal” use of kephalē. But it is still a rather clear instance where kephalē conveys authority, is it not?

   Philip B. Payne: Josephus did affirm that “the royal city Jerusalem was the supreme, and rules (archei) over all the neighboring country.” Josephus, however, almost certainly did not intend “rules” in a political sense since this same paragraph next identifies by name many “inferior” (presumably in size) cities of Judah “which are also parts of the kingdom of Agrippa.” Josephus in this very paragraph acknowledged that Agrippa ruled that area. Jerusalem did not in a political sense “rule over all the neighboring country.” What sense, then, did Josephus intend by “Jerusalem rules over all the neighboring country”?

   Two key reasons make Josephus’s “head” simile make sense to Greek readers. First, Jerusalem is geographically elevated over the neighboring country. Second, kephalē was an appropriate word for Josephus to choose because “top” and “apex” were established meanings of kephalē. According to secular Greek dictionaries and clearly evident in LXX usage, however, “authority” was not an established meaning of kephalē.

   Jerusalem appeared as “head” in the common, established sense of kephalē, “top.” “Jerusalem stands on hills at an elevation of 2575 feet (785 metres). Jerusalem is located roughly in the middle of a range of low mountains running north to south throughout central Israel between the Mediterranean and the Jordan Valley, stretching from the Jezreel Valley in the north all the way to Beer Sheva in the south. To the east the city looks down on the Dead Sea and across the Jordan River to the arid mountains of eastern Jordan (the biblical mountains of Moab). To the west it faces the coastal plain and the Mediterranean Sea about 35 miles (60 km) away” (https://www.britannica.com/place/Jerusalem/Landscape). Consequently, Josephus probably intended “rules” in the sense of “dominates geographically” by its elevation. This may be why the William Whiston’s edition of Josephus, War, 3.54 translates this instance of archei “presides” rather than “rules” (http://penelope.uchicago.edu/josephus/war-3.html).

   Josephus’s simile “as the head (kephalē) does over the body” compares Jerusalem to a physical head over a physical body. No such simile that compares something to a physical head is ever adequate grounds for positing “authority” as a new meaning for “head.” Consequently, this is not a clear instance where kephalē means or even “conveys” authority.

   Preston appeals to Plato to equate simile and metaphor, but the full citation of Aristotle, Rhet. 3.4.1 clearly shows their difference:
   “The simile also is a metaphor; for there is very little difference. When the poet says of Achilles, “he rushed on like a lion,” it is a simile; if he says, “a lion, he rushed on,” it is a metaphor; for because both are courageous, he transfers the sense and calls Achilles a lion.”
   To convey this meaning, both statements presuppose that readers associate a lion with courage. In this case, the meaning “courageous” for “lion” is so well established that most readers will automatically assume this meaning. If you substitute “opossum” or “beagle” for “lion,” neither statement convey a clear meaning. The word “lion” means “courageous,” only in the metaphor (“a lion, he rushed on”), not the simile (“he rushed on like a lion”). Furthermore, only the metaphor provides evidence of “courage” being a meaning of “lion.” For two reasons, it is virtually certain that Aristotle did not intend this statement to be about what we call “lexical meanings,” namely the varying meanings that can be listed for a word in a dictionary. First,in writing this, Aristotle equated the meaning of the two sentences, but it is only in the case of the metaphor that the word “lion” means “courageous.” If Aristitole had been thinking of the meaning of the word “lion,” Aristotle would not equated the simile with the metaphor. Consequently, it should be clear that Plato was not referring to “lexical meanings” like we are studying regarding kephalē, but rather of the meaning of these two entire sentences.

   Second, as far as we know, there were no dictionaries in Aristotle’s day that listed the various possible metaphorical meanings of words. According to
   https://www.roger-pearse.com/weblog/2014/06/23/lexicon-an-introduction-to-the-dictionaries-of-ancient-greek-that-survive-from-antiquity/ “Hesychius, Prologue, tells us that the first attempt, to unite the pre-existing single-author glossaries into a unified work covering all authors, in alphabetical order, was that of Diogenianus [2nd century A.D.]. According to the Suda, he lived in the time of Hadrian. But the Suda also states that even this was an epitome of a pre-existing compilation by Pamphilus [of Alexandria, 1st century A.D. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pamphilus_of_Alexandria%5D and Zopyrion. See also the useful survey of Greek dictionaries in: Dickey, Eleanor. “Greek dictionaries ancient and modern.” Classical Dictionaries: Past, Present, and Future. Ed. Christopher Stray. 2010. 5–24. It is highly unlikely that Aristotle, prior to the existence of lexicons, here addresses distinctions in lexical meaning.

   Preston: “If it was believed (and it was) that the literal head exercises some kind of ruling function over the literal body, this can help inform how “head” might be understood in a head/body metaphor. According to Josephus above, the literal kephalē rules over the body, and he felt like this was an apt parallel to Jerusalem’s “rule over all the neighboring country.”

   Philip B. Payne: Preston anachronistically argues from what we know today about the brain to what Hellenistic readers believed in Paul’s day. Preston assumes that “it was believed … that the literal head exercises some kind of ruling function over the literal body” and that Josephus believed that “the literal kephalē rules over the body.” According to the Oxford Classical Dictionary, the first assumption was a minority view. The second is also in doubt since, as I just argued, Josephus distinguishes Jerusalem’s “rule” from Agrippa’s political rule. This context supports the view that Josephus was referring to Jerusalem being geographically higher than all the neighboring country “as the head (kephalē) is over the body.”

   The ancient Greek world through the time of Paul commonly believed that the heart, not the head, was the center of emotions and spirit, the “central governing place of the body” (Aristotle, De Motu Animalium 2.703a.35, translation from The Words of Aristotle, ed. A. Smith and W. E. Russ; Oxford: Clarendon, 1908–52). Representing common belief, Aristotle wrote of the heart as the “primary or dominating part … the centre wherein abides the sensory soul” (De Partibus Animalium 3.4.665b.17). Apparently, “having found the brain to be devoid of sensation, he concluded that it could not be associated with it. The function of the brain was to keep the heart from overheating the blood” Charles Joseph Singer and Abraham Wasserstein, “Anatomy and Physiology,” in The Oxford Classical Dictionary, ed. N. G. L. Hammond and H. H. Scullard, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1970) p. 59. Aristotle taught that the heart was not only the seat of control but also the seat of intelligence. Classicist Michael Wigodsky of Stanford is probably correct that many, even the doctors with the most advanced anatomical understanding of the brain, did not really believe that the brain exerted more control over the body than the heart (conversations with the author at Stanford University, Sept. 27 and Oct. 4, 1984). Such a notion seemed to contradict the nearly universal believe that, since the life is in the blood, the heart must be the center of life. Thus, it is hardly surprising that the idea of authority was not normally associated with the word for “head” in Greek thought.

   The absence of references to brain (ἐγκέφαλος) in the traditional Pauline corpus and its use of heart (καρδία) fifty-two times for functions now attributed to the brain (for example, 1 Corinthians 2:9) indicate that the writers of the Pauline corpus, including Paul’s amanuenses, probably did not think of the head as the body’s command center. This undermines a key assumption underlying the view that κεφαλή means person in rank before in the Pauline corpus.

   Preston argues from the following translation of Ephesians 1:22: God “appointed him to be head over (kephalen huper) everything for the church.”

   Philip B. Payne: In Greek, the verb is “gave” (ἔδωκεν) him, head [namely “apex”] over all things, “to” the church (dative of indirect object), not “appointed him to be head over everything for the church.” Many scholars support the translation “gave … to.” J. Armitage Robinson, St. Paul’s Epistle to the Ephesians, p, 41: “Him hath He given … to the church.” John R. W. Stott, God’s New Society: The Message of Ephesians, p. 61: God “’gave’ (edōke) him as head-over-all-things to the church which is his body.” T. K. Abbot, The Epistles to the Ephesians and to the Colossians, ICC, p. 34: “The verb ἔδωκεν is not for ἔθηκεν [appointed], but with its proper sense, “gave,” is directly connected with τῇ ἐκκλ.[to the church]. The order of the words is not against this, for not only is the position of κεφαλὴν ὑ. π. [head over all] most appropriate to the general sense of the passage, which concerns not the giving, but the giving as Head, but it is also necessary to clearness, in order that ἥτις [which is] may follow ἐκκλ. [church] directly.”

   Preston seems to acknowledge this by writing, “Paul doesn’t specifically say that Christ as head rules over the church. … The dative, tē ekklesia (“for/to the church”) can be rendered several ways, but Clinton Arnold represents the view of most scholars when he says “Christ … is given to the church.” Daniel B. Wallace, Greek Grammar: Beyond the Basics, p.141, confirms this, “The indirect object … is normally recognized as he most common dative.” In this case, because the transitive verb is “gave,” any Greek reader would assume that the dative with “the church” identifies the church as indirect object: “God … gave him [Christ], head over all things, to the Church.”
   Preston dismisses the meaning “apex” for “head” because he says, “kephalē occurs in a cluster of images that convey ruling activity.” In fact, kephalē does not occur “in” a cluster of images that convey ruling activity, but in a separate clause “after” a cluster of images that all depict Christ as “far above all rule and authority ….” The spatial wording throughout Ephesians 1:20–22 emphasizes Christ as the apex of all authority: “raised … made him sit at his right hand in the heavenly places, far above … and above … and has put all things under his feet and has given him, apex over all things, to the church.” (1:20–22). The context and the range of established meaning of kephalē at that time clearly favors the meaning “apex” or “top.” This passage does not identify Christ as “head of the church” or “authority over the church.” It states that God “gave” Christ, apex over all things, to the church.

   When Paul writes that Christ is “far above all rule and authority and power and dominion,” it is clear that Paul is affirming Christ as the highest authority. So when Paul wrote that God gave Christ, head-apex over all things, to the Church, it is clear from the context that it is Christ, the highest authority over all things, that God gave to the church. But three things should make it evident that “head” here does not “mean” authority.

   First, Paul did not state that Christ is the “rule” over all rule, or the “authority” over all authority, or the “power” over all power, or the “dominion” over all dominion. Paul stated instead that Christ is “far above all rule and authority and power and dominion.” In each instance, what Paul actually states is that Christ is “far above” all of these different categories of authority. So when Paul follows by referring to Christ as “head over all things” the most natural referent of “head” is “far above,” hence the meaning “apex.” Paul’s readers could understand this because “apex” and “top” were firmly established meanings of kephalē when Paul wrote.

   Second, many of the things that Christ is said to be “far above” in this context are not authorities, including “every name that is named, not only in this age but also in that which is to come.” Similarly, when Paul continues the spatial exaltation of Christ by saying that “and he has put all things under his feet,” most of those things are not authorities. Furthermore, none of the spatial exaltation language in verse 20, “he raised him from the dead and made him sit at his right hand in the heavenly places” makes any explicit reference to authorities of any sort. Consequently, when Paul immediately after all of these affirmations that Christ is far above all things, including things that are not authorities, it is more natural to understand “head” to convey, “God gave him, apex over all things, to the church” than “God gave him authority over all things, to the church.”

   Third, in contrast to abundant confirmation in secular Greek dictionaries that “apex” and “top” were firmly established meanings of kephalē when Paul wrote, “authority” was not an established meaning of kephalē when Paul wrote. I have not found a single citation of any meaning related to “authority” in any secular Greek dictionary prior to the 4th century AD. The seventh and eighth editions of the most widely used classical Greek dictionary, Liddell and Scott’s, identify the meaning “chief” as “Byzantine.” Dhimitrakou’s 9-volume dictionary lists the meaning “leader” as “medieval.” Both are historical periods long after Paul wrote.

   Consequently, it is more likely that Paul’s readers understood kephalē in Ephesians 1:22 to mean “apex” than “authority.” This is further confirmed by LXX usage. LXX translators almost always, 226 of 239 times, translated the Hebrew word for “head” when referring to a physical head kephalē. Furthermore, it was common for the LXX translators to choose Greek words to convey non-Greek, Hebrew meanings. In spite of both of these facts, the LXX translators almost always chose a word other than kephalē to translate “head” when it meant “leader.” Of the 161 times that the Hebrew word for “head” by itself (not combined with the lamed prefix) means “leader,” the best-attested text of the LXX only once translated “head” kephalē clearly as a metaphor meaning “leader.” In sharp contrast, in seven of the eighteen times that the Hebrew word for “head” combined with the lamed prefix, means “leader,” at least one manuscript translates it eis kephalēn [Note that I am not including Deuteronomy 28:13 because both the Hebrew and LXX text explain “head” to mean “top.”]. In four of these, eis kephalēn is the best-established LXX text: Judges 11:11; 2 Samuel 22:44; Psalm 17:44 (English 18:44); and Lamentations 1:5. In three other cases, only Codex Alexandrinus translated “as head” eis kephalēn: Judges 10:18; 11:8 and 9. The sharp contrast between 1 of 161 and 7 (or 4) of 19 shows that the LXX translators almost never translated “head” when it meant “leader” kephalē unless it was expressed in a way readers could understand as a simile, “as head.” This shows that comparing a person to a head (“as head” eis kephalēn) was far less jarring to the ears of Hellenistic readers than calling a person “head.” This also emphasizes the difference between simile and metaphor.

   Preston refers to “the ancient understanding of the head/body as expressed in medical writers and other philosophers.” This is far too simplistic. Contrast the Oxford Classical Dictionary’s entry for “Anatomy and Physiology” I cited earlier. The ancient Greek world through the time of Paul commonly believed that the heart, not the head, was the center of emotions and spirit, the “central governing place of the body” (Aristotle, De Motu Animalium 2.703a.35. The absence of references to brain (ἐγκέφαλος) in the traditional Pauline corpus and its use of heart (καρδία) fifty-two times for functions now attributed to the brain (for example, 1 Corinthians 2:9) indicate that the writers of the Pauline corpus, including Paul’s amanuenses, probably did not think of the head as the body’s command center.

   Preston again refers to “Paul’s prior use of kephalē (Eph. 1:22) clearly refers to ruling authority.” As argued above, it is doubtful that Ephesians 1:22 refers to “ruling authority.”

   Preston’s reply to a comment states, “The metaphor of “head” by itself conveys some sense of authority.” This is simply not true as the following eleven examples prove. In all eleven, “head” clearly means “source” without authority:

   Philo, De congressu quaerendae eruditionis Gratia 12 #61, “of all the members of the clan here described Esau is the progenitor (ὁ γενάρχης ἐστὶν Ἐσαῦ), the head (κεφαλή) as it were of the whole creature.”

   Philo, De praemiis et poenis 125 affirms that “the virtuous one, whether single man or people, will be the head of the human race, κεφαλὴν μὲν τοῦ ἀνθρωπειοῦ γένους ἔσεσθαι [explained by the editor as “the source of spiritual life”] and all the others like the limbs of a body which draw their life from the forces in the head (κεφαλή) and at the top.”

   Apoc. Mos. 19.3 calls “lust the head [κεφαλή MSS A and B] of every sin.” M. D. Johnson (Life of Adam and Eve) translates κεφαλή “origin” (OTP 2:279). MS C’s “root and beginning/first cause” confirms the meaning “source/origin.”

   Testament of. Reuben 2.2: “For seven spirits are established against mankind, and they are the sources [αἱ κεφαλαί] of the deeds of youth.” Manuscripts Aa and S have κεφαλή (singular).

   Hippocrates, Coac. 498 (5th century BC) and Galen, de Usu Partim 7.14 (4.565 d, 2nd century AD) used κεφαλή metaphorically to identify the “origins” of muscle, τῶν μυῶν αἱ κεφαλαί.

   Galen, On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato 6.3.21.4: “The greater is source of the smaller, just as the spring is greater than the channels into which it is divided. … No river that comes from a single spring is smaller at its head than it is thereafter.”

   Galen, De locis affectis 3.12 notes that whirlpools in a river “arise when they are warmed by the sun or its source (singular τὴν κεφαλήν) is heated in some other way.”

   Herodotus, History 4.90: “From the sources (κεφαλαί) of the river Tearus flows the best and fairest of all river waters.”

   The Greek Anthology Epigram 9.703.2: “The sources (κεφαλαί) of the river Tearus supply the best … water.”

   Joannes Philoponus, De Generatione Animalium 14.3.1 notes that a river, when it rushed upon a rock, might divide and become two streams, even though it had but a single source (κεφαλή).

   In all eleven of these passages, κεφαλή means “source” with no contextual association with authority. Consequently, it cannot be true as Preston alleges that “The metaphor of ‘head’ by itself conveys some sense of authority.”

   Reply
4. 

   Karen on March 22nd, 2024 - 9:03am

   I find it curious that you say the context of Ephesians 4 is quite different than the context of Ephesians 1 – it seems to me that there are quite a few repeated themes and references that tie the two together quite tightly. The verses in Ephesians 1 are the thesis statement – Ephesians 4 is where Paul elaborates on it.

   Not only is Paul revisiting and expanding on the head/body metaphor in Eph 4, he repeatedly references the “the fullness of Him who fills all in all” from chapter 1 phrasing throughout the expanded head/body metaphor in chapter 4 (vv 6, 10, 13). And the body metaphor in both places is immediately preceded by someone being given to the church – “And He gave some as apostles… for the building up of the body of Christ” (4:11-12), all “according to the measure of the gift of Christ” (4:7) who was “given as head over all (things) for/to the church, which is his body” (1:22-23).

   It seems pretty clear to me that chapter 4 IS the answer to what Paul means by the head/body metaphor in chapter 1 (and potentially throughout his letters since he develops the same theme in multiple places).

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5. 

   Rick Evans on March 26th, 2024 - 9:22am

   I appreciate your research into the wording and your attempts to carefully handle the resources you are utilizing. My main concern is that you seem to be leaving out much discussion on what may have been the situation in Ephesus that Paul was addressing. Granted, new scholarship on that seems to come out regularly, but what the context was in that specific city and church most likey would shine some light on how Paul (assuming it was Paul) may have been using his terms.

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